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Competition, Kinship or Reciprocity? 





Efforts to predict the consequences of agricultural policies in the context of developing 
countries have been extensively studied in the literature. What is worrying is that such 
policies sometimes change supply in the wrong direction. This phenomenon has puzzled 
economist  for  long,  trying  to  explain  the  ‘hidden’  motives  underlying  household 
responses. Singh et al. (1986) describe the effect of agricultural profits on the marketed 
surplus  of  staple  foods;  Finskelshtain  and  Chalfant  (1991)  and  Fafchamps  (1992) 
elaborate on the effects of multivariate price risk on production and consumption; and de 
Janvry et al. (1991) describe the influence of transaction costs on supply response. The 
search for an explanation led to agricultural household models, in which production and 
consumption decisions are linked, because the decision-making entity is both a producer 
and a consumer. 
Household models resolve the apparent paradox of a positive own-price elasticity 
of demand for food in farm households, as well as the puzzle of sluggish market-surplus 
responses to food-price changes. Yet they fail to explain similar phenomena in non-food 
commodities,  where  markets  are  complete  and  separability  assumption  holds.  In  this 
paper, we examine this possibility using village experiments in commodity market. We 
show that existence of reciprocity among sellers, that characterize trader idiosyncrasy, 
has a powerful effect on equilibrium selection. This signifies that, even if price falls, 
sellers  will  trade  in  anticipation  of  the  expected  future  reciprocity,  making  short  run 
losses only to be compensated in the long run.   2 
Our analysis is conducted in the context of a village market, where cotton is being 
traded. This market, with many farmers as sellers and different traders as buyers, can be 
characterized as near perfect. Although prices within the village vary between traders, the 
maximum  bid  is  determined  outside  the  village  market.  The  commodity  traded  is 
homogeneous, and both buyers and sellers know with certainty its monetary value or in 
other words, there is no information asymmetry. 
We present two main results. The first result demonstrates that sellers’ reciprocal 
responses are strong enough to render large volumes in favor of a trader who does not 
offer the best price. This is an important violation of the most basic principle in the 
competitive  paradigm,  which  we  refer  to  as  trader-idiosyncratic  effect.  Yet  another 
violation is its corollary, the repeal of the law of one price. Both observations suggest that 
reciprocity  motives  may  indeed  be  capable  of  driving  a  competitive  market  towards 
Pareto  inefficient  equilibrium.  Our  second  result  points  to  the  importance  of  trader 
idiosyncrasy, a phenomenon which does not only have the power to distort markets but 
can also corner most incentives offered through price policy. As a consequence price 
policies will have very different behavioral and welfare implications for farm households. 
An upshot of the existence of these motives in trade reflects the limited role of price 
incentives. 
Our work is closely related to two areas of literature that document deviations 
from  the  common  behavioral  assumptions.  The  idea  that  fairness  motives  can  affect 
competitive market outcomes is reported in a number of studies (Okun, 1981; Akerlof, 
1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). These analyses contain the important insight that fair 
behavior is instrumental to the maximization of long-run profits. Most of this literature is   3 
theoretical  and  confined  to  labor  market  studies,  often  lacking  rigorous  empirical 
evidence, although studies based on laboratory experiments exists (Fehr et al., 1998). 
There is also an extensive literature on kinship which suggests that those who 
break caste customs may suffer economically with its own set of mutual assistance ethics 
and social sanctions to enforce (Akerlof, 1976; Hoff and Sen, 2005; Collier and Garg, 
1999).  These  models  add  an  important  facet  to  kinship  studies  missing  in  previous 
models of discrimination, but they present mixed evidence when kinship is exposed to 
market.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section II presents the data and 
describes the setting, while results are presented in section III. In section IV, we discuss 
possible interpretations in the context of the broader literature.  
 
II. Data and the Village Setting 
The data for this study was collected based on a census, which we implemented in the 
village of Kanzara, located in the state of Maharashtra, India. This village has been the 
focus of research for several decades.
1 Comprehensive data collection was carried out in 
all 305 households of the village between March and August 2004. The questionnaire 
covered all household activities and transactions during the period from April 2003 to 
March 2004. The results that we report here are based on cotton traded over four months 
                                                 
1 Several sample surveys have been carried out in Kanzara by the International Crops Research Institute for 
the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT). See Walker and Ryan (1990) for a detailed discussion.   4 
during the harvest and post-harvest period, when most of the cotton that is cultivated is 
sold.
2 
Most  of  the  cotton  cultivated  is  sold  either  to  traders  within  the  village  or 
transported to the nearest market outside the village, where prices are generally expected 
to be higher.
3 In addition to the household interviews, we gathered data on transactions 
from records maintained by the traders. Most traders are operating in groups, so that they 
have to maintain written records, in order to calculate individual profit shares. We use 
these trader records on quantities and prices, as they are more accurate than the recall 
data obtained from the farm households. 
There were in total eight individual traders operating in five groups within the 
village accounting for 50 percent of all cotton transactions and about 36 percent of total 
cotton volumes traded. Rests of the transactions were made between farmers and outside 
the village traders. We only focus on the transactions within the village and club the five 
trader groups together into two trading entities: Trader A, representing one group which 
accounts for 80 per cent of within village transactions, and Trader B, representing the 
other four groups. 
  Within village trade is characterized in Table 1. Two deviations from economic 
theory  become  apparent.  The  first  is  the  negation  of  the  most  basic  principles  of 
economics: the law of one price. Since all village traders sell the cotton in the same 
outside-village  market,  the  price  offered  to  farmers  should  reflect  the  outside-village 
price  minus  transaction  costs.  Given  a  near  homogeneous  commodity,  perfect 
                                                 
2 Whether a transaction is in the harvest or post harvest period varies from seller to seller depending on the 
time of the realization of the transaction. If the transaction takes place immediately after harvest then we 
categorize this as harvest period transaction. 
3 There were 259 sellers in total selling cotton either within the village or outside.   5 
information,  and  no  significant  differences  in  transaction  costs,  competition  between 
traders should ensure a single price within the village, at least over the season as sellers 
learn from past mistakes. Table 1 report that this basic principle is violated in this market.  
Second and the related issue is quantity sold. Assume that trade takes place and 
the  market  exists  for  several  months,  with  each  buyer  setting  his  own  price,  though 
dependent  on  outside-village  market  price  and  market  is  cleared  with  multiple 
equilibrium prices over the period. With perfect information and lack of transaction costs 
within the village, the long run equilibrium will be characterized by a distribution of 
prices that is the highest each time because the highest short run equilibrium prices are 
always Pareto preferred by the sellers. This gives rise to long run equilibrium where the 
largest quantity offered for sale is to the trader with the highest average price over any 
given period. Table 1, however, shows that Trader A, who is dominant in terms of both 
percent transacted and quantity traded, did not offer the highest price. 
Differences between traders in fractions traded and mean prices are statistically 
significant. The volumes traded are significantly higher for Trader A, while the prices 
offered are significantly lower. As mentioned above, we refer to this phenomenon as 
trader-idiosyncratic effect. Obviously, there are reasons that influence the flow of large 
volumes of the commodity in favor of the trader, who does not offer the highest price, 
thus defying some of the predictions of the competitive paradigm. We next examine what 
drove this market to exhibit multiple equilibria. We first discuss possible factors, which 
are then empirically tested in section III. 
 
   6 
Alternative Explanations for the Existence of Multiple Equilibria 
Reciprocity and Market 
Incidentally, in the village market Trader A, the trader with the largest volume of cotton 
traded  is  also  the  village  supplier  of  the  government-subsidized  public  distribution 
system.  Many  of  the  government  programs,  such  as  the  food-for-work  program  and 
housing scheme, as well as regular sales of subsidized goods are controlled by this trader. 
It is quite likely that sellers sold their cotton to Trader A to get favors in many other ways 
that compensates the loss that they may incur by selling at lower prices. It is widely 
known that village outlets are a major spot of distortion (corruption) in the government 
programs, and the beneficiaries strongly depend on the whims of the operator, right from 
quality to prices at which it is sold.
4 Therefore, farmers’ behavior to sell their produce at 
lower prices is not mere generosity, but comes with the tag that current generosity is 
compensated through favors at a later date.
 5 
The importance of such reciprocity was quite evident from household responses. 
But to examine this objectively is a difficult proposition because almost all the farm 
households that involved in cotton trade were dependent on Trader A in many ways. The 
better-endowed households purchase subsidized kerosene for a wide variety of purposes 
apart from purchases of rice. Households at the lower end of the income distribution 
purchase rice and wheat at subsidized rates. Here we do not quantify reciprocal exchange, 
which is difficult to capture, because returns might occur in many ways and over infinite 
periods.  However,  we  examine  reciprocal  exchange  by  an  indicator  of  dependence 
                                                 
4 Depending on the size of each village, one outlet can serve more than one village which gives an idea of 
the quantity transacted and power the operator can exercise on households. 
5  These contracts are not binding, but interactions over infinite periods ensure that agents do not renege on 
a reciprocal exchange agreement (Kranton, 1996).   7 
inferred  from  household  expenditure  profiles.  We  assume  that  value  purchased  at 
subsidized prices is an indicator of dependence. Yet we acknowledge that this indicator 
misses certain aspects which are harder to quantify. In the food-for-work program, for 
instance, beneficiaries are paid in kind (Deshingkar et al., 2005). There are also other 
transfer programs where households are paid in kind or in cash, partly without any quid 
pro quo. In the housing scheme, beneficiaries receive wheat and rice. Most of this is sold 
back  in  exchange  for  cash,  and  the  price  received  again  depends  on  Trader  A.  Such 
transfers are not captured in the household expenditure profiles. 
Kinship and Market 
Another factor that could explain the market anomaly is kinship. Akerlof (1976) uses a 
variant  of  Arrow’s  model  of  statistical  discrimination,  where  those  who  break  caste 
customs suffer economically. Sanctions for those who shirk the obligations of the kin 
system  entail  economic  consequences  like  loss  of  employment,  stigma,  and  social 
ostracism.  It is quite  clear  from the literature that in rural predominantly non-market 
economies the kin system is a valuable institution, providing critical community goods 
and insurance services in the absence of market or public provision of such goods and 
services (Hoff and Sen, 2005). Trader A in Kanzara village belongs to the dominant 
caste. Therefore, it is likely that those sellers who belong to the same caste sold large 
volumes of the commodity to Trader A irrespective of the offer price.  
Neighborhood Effects and Market 
There is also an extensive literature on the importance of  geographical neighborhood 
effects in a wide range of social and economic outcome. Neighborhood effects, which 
appear to be related to individual behavior, may result from the tendency of families with   8 
similar characteristics to live close to each other and to influence each other’s economic 
decisions and outcomes. For instance, Banerjee and Besley (1990) and Akerlof (1997) 
examine the importance of peer effects on educational achievement, while Case and Katz 
(1997) analyze impacts on several outcome variables. Here we examine the importance 
of neighborhood effects in a competitive market setting, to find out whether the observed 
paradox can be explained along similar lines. 
 
III. Results  
Does Price Matter in Volumes Traded? 
Although the price-responsiveness of cotton sellers was shown to be counterintuitive in a 
simple price-quantity framework, the incentive role of prices for volumes traded deserves 
further scrutiny. Table 2 shows important variables that could influence trade. Means and 
standard deviations for the full sample are presented in column 1, while columns 2 and 3 
show a breakdown by traders. Each cotton transaction constitutes one observation. Since 
many farmers sold cotton more than once during the harvest and post-harvest period, the 
total number of observations is bigger than the number of cotton-selling farm households 
in the village. The variables education, age, and religion are in reference to the head of 
the seller households. Rice, wheat, and fuel purchased at subsidized rates are expressed in 
value terms per month. As discussed in the previous section, we use these subsidized 
purchases as indicators of reciprocity. Kinship and neighborhood dummies are defined 
with reference to Trader A. For instance, if a particular seller household belongs to the   9 
same caste or lives in the same neighborhood as Trader A, then the dummy value is 1, 
while it is 0 otherwise.
6 
The effect of prices on volumes traded is presented in Table 3. We first report 
results for the full sample and then examine the segmented markets of Trader A and 
Trader B individually. As a first step, the sellers sort themselves into different segments 
determined  by  the  trader  idiosyncrasy,  and  then  they  wait  for  the  right  price  or  the 
reservation price to sell.  Looking at the total sample, all regressions show a positive 
effect of price on volumes traded, indicating that greater quantities are sold at higher 
prices. Even after controlling for land owned, education, household size, age and trader 
characteristics, price is positive and highly significant. This shows that price matters in 
quantities traded, as suggested by economic theory.  
The  next  important  question  is  whether  trader  idiosyncrasy  has  an  impact  on 
quantities traded. Apart from prices and land owned, kinship, neighborhood effects and 
our indicators of reciprocity are also significant. The negative signs for the neighborhood 
dummy and the reciprocity variables can be interpreted as trade diversion, because these 
effects can divert trade away from markets which have a natural comparative advantage 
in terms of higher prices. 
The regressions for the two segmented markets show similar results with regard to 
prices.
7 In the segmented market of Trader A, reciprocity and neighborhood effects are 
negative, but significant only in the case of reciprocity. In the market of Trader B, both 
                                                 
6 See Walker and Ryan (1990) for details on caste composition in this village. 
7 The results in Table 3 should not be misinterpreted as the farmers’ decision whether to sell to Trader A or 
Trader B. The regressions just analyze the effects of the independent variables on volumes traded within 
each segmented market. The interesting question of what determines the market segmentation will be 
explicitly modeled in the next sub-section, where we introduce the trade-off between the traders as the 
dependent variable. 
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neighborhood  and  reciprocity  effects  are  negative  and  significant  exhibiting  trade 
diversion.   
Trader Idiosyncrasy 
What happens to price if we explicitly model the farmers’ decision in which market to 
sell? Or rather, what determines trade in favor of Trader A? To examine the effect of 
trader idiosyncrasy on the likelihood of trade, we run a probit of sales to Trader A versus 
Trader  B  on  price,  household  size,  age,  religious  dummy,  land  owned,  and  trader 
idiosyncrasy. We examine the trader-idiosyncratic effect in two ways: first in terms of the 
significance of the kinship, neighborhood, and reciprocity variables and second in terms 
of the effect of these variables on the price coefficient, since we argue that the inverse 
supply response is caused by trader idiosyncrasy.  
The first column in Table 4, which does not control for trader idiosyncrasy, shows 
that the price effect is negative and significant. In other words, farmers sell their crop to 
Trader  A  in  spite  of  the  lower  prices  offered.  To  control  for  trader  idiosyncrasy  we 
introduce  neighborhood  effects,  kinship,  and  reciprocity  in  columns  2,  3  and  4, 
respectively.  If  these  effects  can  explain  the  negative  supply  response,  the  price 
coefficient should turn from negative to positive. As expected, the neighborhood effect is 
positive and significant, but this alone only has a small impact on the price coefficient. 
The kinship dummy in column 3 is not significant.  
Results  in  column  4  show  significant  effects  of  reciprocity,  and  –  albeit 
insignificant – the sign of the price coefficient switches. The positive effects of rice and 
wheat  purchases  are  expected  because  more  purchases  will  increase  dependence  on 
Trader A and hence trade irrespective of prices with higher expected future reciprocity.   11 
The negative sign for fuel purchases is somewhat surprising. While rice and wheat are 
imperfect substitutes and rice can be purchased also in the open market, fuel can only be 
purchased  officially  from  Trader  A.  A  fixed  quota  for  fuel  sales  is  predetermined 
statutorily, but in practice the sale was individual specific, with different quantities sold 
at  different  prices.  The  substitution-in  by  richer  and  substitution-out  by  poorer 
households promotes extensive black markets making the impact intractable. 
In columns 5 to 7, we introduce two interaction terms to capture an incidental 
feature  of  the  data  that  both  the  traders  (dominant  in  both  groups)  live  in  the  same 
neighborhood and belong to the same caste, which provides a natural control for both 
neighborhood  and  kinship  effects.  The  interaction  between  wheat  purchased  and  the 
muslim  dummy  shows  that  reciprocity  is  also  significant  among  sellers  who  do  not 
belong to the same caste of Trader A, while the interaction between rice purchased and 
the  neighborhood  dummy  shows  that  reciprocity  is  important  irrespective  of  the 
neighborhood  effect.  Both  interaction  terms  are  jointly  introduced  in  column  7.  The 
results suggest that reciprocity is the most important motivation in the neighborhood to 
trade with Trader A. 
Although these results clearly demonstrate the importance of reciprocity in village 
trade, a couple of shortcomings should be pointed out. The price effect turns positive but 
remains insignificant, which to some extent might be attributable to the inadequacy of the 
purchase variables to capture reciprocity. As mentioned, an important component missing 
in  these  variables  are  in-kind  transfers.  Another  potential  problem  is  the  presence  of 
measurement errors in these variables. And finally, the nature of price formation is not so 
clear in all cases: sellers do not only self-select themselves into different market segments   12 
where prices are exogenous, but often there also exists some degree of bargaining. Hence, 
prices are not only endogenous but are also dependent on sellers’ decision, and might be 
correlated with the error term. Our future work will focus on resolving these potential 




We now come back to our underlying phenomenon of a negative supply response to price 
changes, where markets are complete and separability assumption holds. In this section, 
we proceed to explain this phenomenon in terms of trader idiosyncrasy. In Table 3, we 
reported  significantly  positive  price  elasticity  for  volumes  traded.  This  positive  price 
effect  turned  negative  when  we  introduced  the  trade-off  between  the  traders  as  the 
dependent  variable  in  Table  4.  This  negative  effect  again  turned  positive  when  we 
isolated the effect of reciprocity on the likelihood of trade. This swap in the price effect 
in Table 4 highlights the importance of reciprocity in explaining the negative supply 
response: due to the existence of reciprocity between sellers and a certain trader, a trader-
idiosyncratic effect occurs with the outcome that farm households will sell to this trader, 
even if the price is lowered. Under such circumstances, most of the price incentives will 
be cornered by the trader, and farm households are left with no incentive to increase 
production and marketed surplus. 
The  literature  on  household  models  has  so  far  completely  ignored  the  role  of 
traders. Our results demonstrate that trader idiosyncrasy can determine trade to a large 
extent in situations where no organized trading networks exist. In fact, this should not   13 
surprise  in  a  traditional  village  society,  where  generations  of  households  remain  in 
relatively  close  contact  with  bilateral  repeated  interaction  and  full  information  about 
transacting  parties.  As  a  generalization,  trader  idiosyncrasy  could  not  only  mean 
reciprocity and kinship as in this paper, but also honesty in Dixit (2003), and building 
reputation and trust through fair behavior in Akerlof (1970). 
Concluding Remarks 
In these concluding paragraphs, we will try to summarize the main results and put them 
in the context of the broader literature. We point to two anomalies observed in the village 
commodity  market.  First,  the  repeal  of  the  law  of  one  price,  and  second,  the  trader-
idiosyncratic effect. This outcome is at odds with the conventional model of rational and 
purely  selfish  behavior,  but  can  easily  be  explained,  as  in  this  paper,  in  terms  of 
reciprocity. The sellers’ reciprocal responses were strong enough to render large volumes 
in favor of the trader, who did not offer the best price showing, in the words of Fehr et al. 
(1998), a noncompetitive outcome persisting in a competitive trading institution.
8 
   These results are in contrast to what Kranton (1996) suggests that whether or not 
reciprocity is enforceable depends on market size and agents’ preferences; if a market is 
thick enough, it can be an attractive alternative, and reciprocity cannot be enforced. Most 
part of her argument depends on how large is the size of a large market where only 
market  exchange  survives,  nevertheless  the  market  under  study  cannot  at  least  be 
considered small, given the number of buyers and sellers and the volumes traded. 
Given that trader idiosyncrasy affects market outcome, price policy can have very 
different  behavioral  and  welfare  implication  for  farm  households.  An  implication  of 
                                                 
8 Similar results have been reported by Fehr et al. (1998) using laboratory experiments in a very different 
context. They refer to this as a remarkable result.   14 
trader  idiosyncrasy  is  that  policies  that  affect  prices  will  result  in  different  supply 
responses.  Policies  that  reduce  such  market  distortions  are  consequently  important 
complements to price policies in affecting supply response. 
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Table 1: Distribution of Within Village Trade 
 
Trader A  Trader B   Ho: Difference  Ho: p-value   
1  2  3  4 
Percent Transacted  80.54  19.46  61.08  (0.0000)* 
Mean Price (Indian Rupees/Quintal)  2433  2462  - 29.04  (0.0472)* 
Percent Volume Traded  75.59  24.41  51.18   
 
Notes: The first row in column 4 reports the p-value of a test of proportion with the null hypothesis that the 
percent transacted is equal across traders. In the second row of column 4, we test the null hypothesis that 
there is no significant difference in prices between traders.  
* Significant at 5-percent level. 
 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of Selling Households in Cotton Transactions 
 
All Transactions  Trader A  Trader B 
1  2  3 
Variable 

















































































































Number of Observations  401  323  78   17 
Table 3: Effect of Prices on Volumes Traded 
All Transactions  Trader A  Trader B  Dependent Variable: Quantity 
1  2  3  1  2  3  1  2  3 



























































































    -0.1551 
(0.1427) 
    -0.6591** 
(0.3992) 
   
Kinship Dummy    0.2334** 
(0.1353) 
    0.2028 
(0.1503) 





    -0.0024** 
(0.0013) 
    -0.0027* 
(0.0014) 




    -0.0007** 
(0.0004) 
    -0.0004 
(0.0005) 
    -0.0017** 
(0.0010) 
R-squared  0.1826  0.1805  0.1514  0.2141  0.2159  0.1958  0.1304  0.1194  0.0710 
Sample size  401  401  401  323  323  323  78  78  78 
 
Notes: Each column presents results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is volumes traded per transaction. A constant term is included in all the 
regressions. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
* Significantly different from zero at 5-percent level.  
** Significantly different from zero at 10-percent level.   18 
Table 4: Effect of Trader Idiosyncrasy on Likelihood of Trade 
Marginal effect on trade for Trader A  Dependent Variable: Trade Dummy 
(1 if traded with Trader A and 0 with Trader B)  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 


































       






       








  0.0406 
(0.0730) 
 
















  0.1510* 
(0.0437) 
         
Kinship Dummy 
 
    0.0091 
(0.0465) 
       
Rice Purchased 
 
      0.0022** 
(0.0011) 
     
Fuel Purchased 
 
      -0.0003** 
(0.0002) 





      0.0006** 
(0.0003) 
  0.0005** 
(0.0003) 
 
Wheat Purchased –Muslim Interaction          0.0011* 
(0.0005) 
  0.0003 
(0.0004) 




Sample size  401  401  401  401  401  401  401 
 
Notes: Each column documents the results of a probit model where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a transaction is with Trader A, and 0 otherwise. 
Reported in the table are estimated marginal changes in probability at mean values for the continuous variables and estimated discrete changes for the dummy 
variables. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
* Significantly different from zero at 5-percent level. 
** Significantly different from zero at 10-percent level. 